Nevertheless, on the ground, commercial treaties were honoured more in the breach than in the observance 11 . Moreover, the actual impact of military operations on trade should be nuanced, in view of the numerous mutual accusations of continuous trade during conflicts 12 . In spite of numerous factual aggressions, the continuity of trade was the rule. Wartime disturbances were exceptions, to be restrictively interpreted 13 . Confiscations of private property were regularly framed as violations of the "law of nations 14 ". Conversely, even between allies, trade remained a zero-sum game of fierce competition. Partners in a common political undertaking were perceived as trustful as outside neutrals or enemies 15 , "exploiting every occasion to thwart and ruin commerce and navigation 16 ". These general aggressive dynamics should not reverse the intellectual order of priorities. Diplomats put balance of power first, individual merchants' complaints on violations of the regulation of trade only came in second place. Actions by the navy or consuls could only be undone by "rigorous orders" from London or Paris, and they were subject to diplomatic negotiations, rather than to "respect for treaties and conventions 17 ".
The aim of the present contribution is to show how geopolitical Grand Strategy had its repercussions on trade policy and on the legal language used to frame it, and, conversely, how a discourse of interdependence and free trade was so present that all parties used it indiscriminately. Commercial treaties as an instrument of regulation should not be separated from the geopolitical structure that underpins their normative environment. The case of Franco-British intervention at justified by the admiral by reference to an order of the Regent to seize all French ships transporting goods for Spain (de la Laurie, Naples, 20 December 1718, AN, Marine, B1, 40, f. 21v). In the same vein: de Camp (The Hague), 29 December 1718, ibid., f. 30V: French complaints on Dutch depredations should be temporarily shelved, since treating them would hamper Franco-British tentatives to lure the Republic into the Quadruple Alliance.
10 E.g. Chammorel's report, 28 June 1717 on negotiations with James Craggs, Secretary of State for the Southern Department, o.c., f. 447v: "the crisis where negotiations on Italy are in at present will further prolong the resolutions we had hoped for since a long time". Similar complaints on the breach of the dispositions in the Franco-English trade Convention of Utrecht (11 April 1713, CUD [Corps Universel Diplomatique du Droit des Gens] VIII/1, nr. CLII, artt. XVIII-XX): "although the English had insisted the most on phrasing the treaty in these terms, forcing us [France] to derogate to all our established ordinances" (Memorandum of the Council of Commerce, 31 January 1719, AN, Marine, B1, 40, f. 35r).
11 E.g. de Camp (The Hague), 29 December 1718, o.c., f. 30r: Dutch corsairs seize French vessels, "worth more than two millions [livres tournois]" after the Treaty of Utrecht; "formally contravening" the trade convention between France and the Dutch Republic. See art. VII, Treaty between Louis XIV and the EstatesGeneral, Utrecht, 11 April 1713, CUD VIII/1, nr. CLVII, 378. 12 Complaint by the Aldermen and Deputies for Commerce of Marseille, 3 and 8 november 1719: "the English actually have an overt trade in all ports of Spain (...) they bring in all kinds of manufactured goods and food. Since the declaration of War [v] His Majesty's subjects have been forbidden access to these advantage (...) their vessels pillaged and searched almost daily, and stopped by those belonging to the English nation without reverence or consideration for the French pavillon" AN, Marine, B1, 36, f. 342r-v. 13 Memorandum by Clairembault (consul in Livorno) to the Regent, 20 January 1719, AN, Marine, B1, f. 46v. Excessive searches and seizures by France's British ally on French vessels or on those of French trading partners, which "interrupts Commerce and Navigation." 14 E.g. Portier (Tenerife), 13 May 1719, AN, Marine, B1, 40, f. 156v (on the conservatory seizure of tobacco stocks belonging to French nationals).
15 E.g. consul Clairembault complaining on British stubborness in releasing goods unduefully seizes on French vessels. Not as much the factual harm to the owners, as the damage to the reputation of the French nation as intermediaries for maritime transport was at stake. If British vessels were implicitly rendered safer, profiting from the British military fleet's dominance, France had few commercial advantages to gain from a war in the Mediterranean (Clairembault (Livorno), 12 May 1719, AN, Marine, B1, 40, f. 137v-138r). 16 18 shows the operation of commercial arguments in wartime.
Intricate conflicts
"The harbours of the Kingdom of Naples daily see Frenchmen in Spanish service (…) of all kinds (…) out of greed, deserters (…) or on their way back to the kingdom after the declaration of war."
De la Leurie (Naples), 26 September 1719 19 The Spanish invasion of Sardinia (22 August 1717) and Sicily (1 July 1718) was a frontal attack on the peace settlement of the Utrecht treaties. The Kingdom of Sardinia had been ceded by Spain to Emperor Charles VI. Sicily was detained by Duke Victor Amadeus II of Savoy 20 . Philip V claimed that the ongoing negotiations between Turin and Vienna to hand over Sicily to the Emperor were a violation of the reversion right, which he retained at the occasion of the Spanish-Savoyard peace treaty 21 . In case the house of Savoy would leave Sicily, the island had to revert back to the crown of
Spain. Yet, none of this had been agreed or executed when Spanish troops landed on the isle, poorly defended by Savoy 22 . Philip merely acted out of conservatory motives, since the reversion right on Sardinia was worth less than that on Sicily 23 . Factually, the island of Sardinia's military importance as a hub for future invasion of Naples and Tuscany counted more 24 .
While Charles VI had a Turkish war at hands on the Balkans, he had to appeal for help. France and Britain were disposed to offer this. However, they were not prepared to inflict a sanction on Spain. 39 Ordinance of Louis XV enjoining his subjects in Spain to come back to France immediately after publication, yet granting a delay of six months to all French merchants presently in Spain to stay there for six more months, in order to withdraw, sell or transport their goods and properties, Paris, 10 January 1719; Ordinance of Louis XV permitting Spanish subjects to stay in France for six months, in order to sell or transport their belongings, Paris, 10 January 1719; Ordinance of Louis XV permitting his subjects to go and collect their properties and goods in Spain, to bring them back in the Kingdom within six months from 10 January, Paris Spanish promises were nevertheless seen as unreliable, as news reached Paris that stocks were seized by Spanish authorities or mandatory sold off to them at a lower price 60 . The Council of Marine asked French consuls in Spain to incite their merchants to evacuate and repair to France as soon as possible 61 . As the war effort strained Spanish resources, higher taxation 62 or confiscations of French vessels became inevitable 63 . As Berwick's army invaded Guipuzcoa and Galicia, French merchants who brought their belongings in safety were blamed by the Spanish governor for insulting the trustworthiness of Philip V's decree protecting them 64 . In the Mediterranean, admiral Byng's fleet regularly harassed French commercial vessels bound for Sicily or Sardinia, declaring all of them suspect 65 . Courts and tribunals could exercise control the legality of seizures brought in national ports 74 .
Privateering between outsourced public authority and individual greed
Neutral vessels were far from immune from searches. "Free ship, free good" could only be a prudent wish 75 , trade politics in terms of the customs established by reciprocity 76 seemed an impossibility between strong and weaker parties. Conventional or doctrinal definitions of contraband were precarious 77 . Even carriages of grains, sugar or French cheese were stopped 78 ! Shouldn't privateers stop only "enemies, and not friends 79 " ? If principles or past agreements were to have any value, they needed to be reaffirmed time and time again 80 . The law of nations in general was insufficient to provide individuals with efficient legal protection 81 .
In practice, belligerents looked for enemy goods on any ship 82 . "Contrary to all treaties […] the "slightest indication of any merchandise's pertaining to a subject of the King of Spain" was enough 83 to trigger greedy British soldiers or privateers to proceed to search and confiscation, thus scaring off merchants from the Languedoc or Provence. In Livorno, the British consul was withholding French assets, "violating the treaties of Utrecht and the most exact justi0ce 84 92 Report by Clairembault from Livorno, 17 June 1717, AN, Marine, B1, 32, f. 503r-v. In the specific case of the armator Moret, who had been abducted by the Neapolitan corsair Palombo, the French resident in Livorno complained that the latter had searched the vessel and confiscated part of the carriage "without the least pretext". Palombo conducted the vessel to Civitavecchia in the Papal States, but neither the Pope (embroiled with Spain) nor his officers showed impartiality, according to the French resident. See also AN, Marine, B1, 40, f. 16v (de la Leurie, Naples, 13 December 1718): French merchant Magnan sailing from Calabria to Naples on behalf of Genoese clients, caught by a Neapolitan armator who argued his carriage was to be declared "de bonne prise" on the basis of Spanish carriage bills for an earlier voyage to Tenerife. Idem, report by Nieuton (Mallorca), 17 December 1718, on the Tartanne, vessel owned by the French armator Martinenq, seized by a Neapolitan corsair and released again, save for part of its carriage supposedly destined for Spain as contraband. The goods were subsequently sold off… to British tradesmen, in violation of the Quadruple Alliance between the Emperor, France and Spain (AN, Marine, B1, 40, f. 36r). 93 De la Leurie (Naples), 14 March 1719, AN, Marine, B1, 40, f. 110r. 94 Ibid. The Regent insisted that « no trial whatsoever » should take place and called for the immediate release.
confiscation of any vessel capable of transporting troops, including those armed by subjects of allied powers, such as France 95 . France and Austria agreed on mutual regulations concerning seizures, rendering the latter merely conservatory in case of doubt 96 . Neapolitan seizures were transferred to Jean Baptiste du Bourg (1690-1728), the French resident in Vienna, who presented them to the Imperial Court 97 . Unfortunately, the Emperor referred all cases to the Spanish Council, stuffed with his personal creatures 98 , nostalgic of Charles of Habsburg's reign in Spain:
The Neapolitans are gens ramassez, who can't be withheld by any rule of law, yet protected by these people, who will never let them give back what they have taken 99 .
At the apex of British depredations, admiral Byng's practices were seen as extra incitement for the disorderly behaviour of Neapolitan corsairs 100 ! It is illustrative that corsairs from Naples seized a Spanish ship carrying diplomatic correspondence from Venice and handed it over to the British fleet off the coast of Sicily, in order to get their share of the sale 101 . Whoever came across their path was a possible target. The protection of the corsair Palombo was more effective than the Neapolitan or Imperial court's desire of justice. French consuls repeatedly insist on the Neapolitan magistrates taking a personal interest in every privateering commission they delivered 102 . One of the detainees died "a death of misery". Palombo's protectors, as de la Leurie insinuated, had received their share of his bounty 103 . Outside these intricate networks of Neapolitan corruption 104 , Imperial envoys tried to bring their unruly subjects to reason, e.g. enjoining them to appear before local judges in Genoa 105 or offering compensation for harm inflicted by Italian privateers 106 .
In the Spanish case, the use of private agents to protect the colonies is a well-known topic for economic and political historians 107 Some practical influence on local case law could be useful, as stated by the Council of Commerce in the case of Naples: no expenditure is more useful for the navigation of His Majesty's subjects than the annual gratification of 150 piastres paid to the judge competent for seizures of the French nation, who always ranks among the most prominent ministers of the Country [Naples] (…) with the necessary credit and authority to protect and give justice to the French and maintain them in their privileges 119 .
The draft treaty 120
In The problems encountered by French merchants were characterised as the exercise of "criminal activities and piracy" by "private persons, subject either to the allied Powers or the King of Spain", in order to enrich themselves 126 in an unjust way, "with greedy intentions", without "the permission to privateer on the basis of legitimate commissions issued by their sovereigns" (art. V.).
Captains entering the ports of Genoa, Venice or the Grand Duchy of Tuscany would have had to submit themselves to compulsory verification by the local magistrates, as well as the consuls of the "respective powers having an interest in the case". In view of the incessant trouble described above, the text aims as well at the privateers as at the distribution of power between local jurisdictions and consular privileges.
These entities were equipped with their own jurisdictions, able to exercise judicial control over seizures 127 . Their neutrality implied equal treatment for all belligerents. Yet, this was hard to sustain in 120 Convention project between Britain, France, Austria, the Grand Duchy of Tuscany and the Republics of Venice and Genoa, to maintain neutrality in the ports of their dominance and to avoid piracy, Paris, s. Consequently, treacherous or deserting subjects found a genuine free harbour to sell of the benefits of their mischiefs. Commerce with the enemy could thus continue under Spanish pavilion 133 . Spanish privateering vessels could in fact have been armed in Marseille, raised the Spanish pavilion on the high seas, staffed with French sailors, seized an English vessel and safely sailed to Genoa, where their prize could be sold off with the help of French auctioneers 134 . Or, on the other side, the Italian entities could insist on enforcing their neutral status, threatening to visit and search all foreign vessels 135 .
A final clause of the draft treaty laid down sanctions in case a privateer turned out to act on a false commission, under double commission 136 (granted by two sovereigns) or without authorisation.
Vessel and merchandise were to be confiscated to the benefit of the neutral state, which would punish captain, officers and equipment as "forbans" and "gens courans les mers sans aveu 137 ". The regulations did not come into force. Charles VI refused to participate 138 . As explained above, corsairs from Naples were among the most irritating threats to French commerce. If even a pillar of the alliance did not participate, it was useless to impose the articles on Italian neutrals.
Epilogue: the ultimate recourse to natural law
As French and British merchants alike 139 voiced their anger at the depredations they had to suffer, the fundamental nature of free navigation between nations was the cornerstone of their argument. Falling back on the general law of nations as a vector of complaints was not unique. During the conflict, France and Britain were frustrated with Dutch aloofness from the struggle for the common good of Europe. Hispano-Dutch trade could continue unhampered during the conflict, whereas France and Britain would lose part of their market. Conformably to a more general Dutch line of behaviour, the States-General preferred to be medius in bello, or non hostes 140 . Gaining from trade, rather than ruinously spending on defence, as had been the case in the War of the Spanish Succession 141 . This temporary commercial advantage removed the Dutch from the centre of European negotiations. Moreover, the freedom of commerce claimed by the Dutch in the War of the Quadruple Alliance contrasted with their own attitude three years later. In 1722, Emperor Charles VI granted an official patent to the Imperial East Indies Company in Ostend. Britain and the Dutch Republic clamped down on their commercial competitor. The formal legitimacy for the Company's elimination was the violation of the Treaty of Munster, at the occasion of which Philip IV of Spain had denied access to the Indies to his "Castillan" subjects.
The treaty's validity was linked to inherent limitations on the principle of free navigation on the high seas, as it had been expounded by Hugo Grotius's Mare Liberum 142 . The latter point of view is well known. Most of the literature retains the Dutch thesis, supported by influential names as Jean Barbeyrac, professor public law in Groningen. Unfortunately, various pamphlets written against this commercial brutality have fallen into oblivion 143 . Yet, one of these writings, attributed to Imperial historiographer Jean Du Mont de Carels-Kroon 144 , who drafted the commercial treaty allowing the
